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Evaluation of Public-Private Partnerships: A Life-Cycle 1 
Performance Prism for Ensuring Value for Money  2 
 3 
Abstract 4 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) have become an integral strategy to deliver 5 
infrastructure projects in Australia. Yet, PPPs have been plagued with controversy due to 6 
recurrent time and cost overruns. The paucity of an approach to evaluate the performance 7 
of PPPs throughout their life-cycle has hindered the ability of governments to manage their 8 
effective and efficient delivery. This paper examines the practice of evaluation for a 9 
hospital and prison that were delivered using PPPs. The empirical evidence indicates that 10 
with PPPs: (1) performance is typically measured during the construction and operation 11 
phases using time, cost and quality and a restricted number of key performance indicators; 12 
and (2) a process-based and stakeholder-oriented measurement approach would be better 13 
suited to evaluate performance. Building upon the extant literature and the findings 14 
emerging from ‘practice’ (i.e., actual activity, events or work), a Performance Prism for 15 
ameliorating the evaluation of PPPs throughout their lifecycle is proposed. The research 16 
presented in this paper provides stakeholders of PPPs, especially governments, with a 17 
robust framework for governing and future proofing their assets to ensure value for money. 18 
 19 
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Introduction 26 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) have been extensively used to deliver public assets, 27 
when governments’ budgets for infrastructure development are limited. The PPP market in 28 
Australia is considered to be mature and sophisticated; it forms an integral part of State 29 
Governments’ procurement strategies for delivering infrastructure (Hodge, 2004; Duffield 30 
and Clifton, 2008). Yet, the use of PPPs has been plagued with controversy, particularly in 31 
Australia and the United Kingdom (UK), where many projects have experienced 32 
substantial overruns and poor operational performance, for example, Southern Cross 33 
Station, Melbourne, Australia (cost overruns), Latrobe Regional Hospital, Victoria, 34 
Australia (poor service quality) and Dalmuir Wastewater Treatment Works, Scotland, UK 35 
(poor operational outputs) (Harris et al., 2014; Regan, 2014).  36 
 37 
A variety of factors can contribute to the unsatisfactory performance of PPPs (Liu et al., 38 
2015b), including ineffective project evaluation which has been reported in the literature 39 
(e.g., Yuan et al., 2012; Liu et al., 2015a; Love et al., 2015). Essentially, performance 40 
evaluation is critical to business success, particularly at the corporate and project levels 41 
(Love and Holt, 2000; Kagioglou et al., 2001; Liu et al., 2014; 2015c). Yuan et al. (2009) 42 
has suggested that the absence of an effective performance evaluation within PPPs acts as 43 
a trigger for producing below optimum quality of the public services. Despite this, most 44 
procured PPP projects have not undergone a comprehensive evaluation in terms of what 45 
has been delivered (Hodge, 2005; Regan et al., 2011). Further, the accountability of the 46 
government involved with PPPs has shifted to enhancing the effectiveness of service 47 
quality and efficiency of public resources. This has resulted in increasing demand for a 48 
more robust evaluation as a governance tool for the projects (Wu et al., 2016). 49 
 50 
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This paper examines the ‘practice’ (i.e., actual activity, events or work) of performance 51 
evaluation for two social infrastructure projects procured using a PPP: (1) hospital; and (2) 52 
prison. In conjunction with the extant literature, the findings are used to interpret PPP 53 
performance evaluation and then adapt and develop a life-cycle Performance Prism 54 
valuable for the public sector to improve the projects’ evaluations and ensure Value for 55 
Money (VfM) is delivered for an asset from ‘cradle’ to ‘grave’. 56 
 57 
Public-Private Partnerships and Performance Evaluation 58 
There is no universally accepted definition for PPPs. The European Investment Bank (EIB) 59 
(2004) defines PPPs as “the relationships formed between private sector and public bodies 60 
often with an aim of introducing private sector resources and/or expertise to provide and 61 
deliver public assets and services (p.2).” Notably, the European Commission (2003) states 62 
that governments embark on PPPs to: 63 
  64 
• accelerate the provision of infrastructure by allowing the public sector to translate 65 
capital expenditure into a flow of on-going service payments;  66 
• ensure timely project implementation by allocating responsibility for design and 67 
construction to be undertaken by the private sector;  68 
• reduce whole life cost and provide incentives to the private sector to minimise costs 69 
and improve the management of a project’s life-cycle;  70 
• reduce government risk exposure by transferring to the private sector; 71 
• improve service quality and innovation via the use of private-sector expertise and 72 
performance incentives; and 73 
• enhance prudent management of public expenditure and reduce corruption by 74 
increasing accountability and transparency. 75 
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There has been a tendency for PPP research to focus on the following areas: (1) the 76 
development of critical success factors (CSF); (2) governments’ roles/responsibilities; (3) 77 
selection of concessionaire; (4) risk allocation/management; (5) effectiveness/efficiency of 78 
project implementation; and (6) project finance (Liu et al., 2015b). Table 1 summarises the 79 
scope of PPP research over the past two decades. Noteworthy, there is a dearth of research 80 
that has addressed PPP evaluation with empirical research being limited to Garvin et al. 81 
(2011), Yuan et al. (2012) and Mladenovic et al. (2013). 82 
 83 
Table 1: Scope of the research on PPPs 84 
Research Themes Authors 
Critical Success Factors Tiong (1996); Qiao et al. (2001); Jefferies et al. (2002); Li et al. (2005); Jefferies (2006); and Liu et al. (2015c). 
Government’s roles/responsibilities 
Kumaraswamy and Zhang (2001); Pongsiri (2002); Koch and 
Buser (2006); da Cruz et al. (2013); Van den Hurk (2016); and 
Wu et al. (2016). 
Concessionaire selection Zhang and Kumaraswamy (2001); Zhang et al. (2002); Zhang (2004, 2005a); and Jang (2011). 
Risk allocation/management 
Wang et al. (2000); Grimsey and Lewis (2002); Thomas et al. 
(2003); Jin (2011); Chan et al. (2011); and Roberts and 
Siemiatycki (2015). 
Effectiveness/efficiency of 
implementation of PPPs 
Lemos et al. (2002); Edelenbos and Teisman (2008); Trumbull 
(2009); Beisheim and Campe (2012); Taylor and Harman 
(2015); Kort et al. (2015). 
Project finance Levy (1996); Ye and Tiong (2000); Zhang (2005b); Devapriya (2006); Regan et al. (2011); and Engel et al. (2013). 
 85 
While the aforementioned studies have made a valuable contribution to raising the 86 
significance of performance evaluation within PPPs, they have stopped short of tackling 87 
how to comprehensively evaluate them throughout their life-cycle (Liu et al., 2015b; Love 88 
et al., 2015). Thus, empirical research aiming to address this significant theoretical issue is 89 
required (Koontz and Thomas; 2012; Liu et al., 2016). Haponava and Al-Jibouri (2012) 90 
further this view as they have suggested that there is a need to identify a new approach for 91 
 
 
 
5 
evaluating construction projects (especially infrastructure projects) to enable life-cycle 92 
project success. In fact, the traditional approach for performance evaluation is based on the 93 
triumvirate of time, cost and quality (TCQ). It has been widely criticised for not being able 94 
to accommodate the dynamic and changing nature of projects throughout their life-cycle. 95 
Baccarini (1999) suggests project success needs to encapsulate both product and process 96 
views. Product success is concerned with the long-term impacts of the built asset on local 97 
community/region. Conversely, process success relates to effectiveness and efficiency of 98 
the managerial actions or activities that are performed (Baccarini, 1999).  99 
 100 
Research Approach 101 
The debate about PPPs has moved beyond ideological arguments about their advantages 102 
and disadvantages to focusing on ‘how’ to structure and/or manage the projects throughout 103 
their life cycles to achieve the predetermined policy objectives and goals (Yong, 2010). In 104 
line with this focus, a case study is used to determine and explore ‘how’ performance 105 
measurement in PPP projects can be improved. According to Flyvbjerg (2006), a case 106 
study is suitable for all stages of a research, and particularly useful for generalizing and/or 107 
examining new knowledge. Moreover, performance measurement research tends to marry 108 
with the ontology and epistemology of interpretivism. Therefore, practitioners’ experiences 109 
and insights should not be ignored when deriving a new performance measurement system 110 
(PMS) for the organisation (Neely et al., 2000). Similarly, Love et al. (2002) identify that 111 
research of this nature should not rely on a positivist approach, as it may neglect the 112 
impact of human behaviour and subsequent decision-making processes that can be 113 
enacted.  114 
 115 
The cases selected for this research were the only social infrastructure PPPs being 116 
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delivered by a State Government at the time of the research. The State Government and 117 
participants of each of the Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV) demonstrated a willingness to 118 
participate in the research. A cross-sectional case study was adopted to provide an in-depth 119 
understanding of the nature of performance measurement. The cross-sectional approach 120 
was intended to minimize disruption to participants who agreed to partake in the research. 121 
Since the completion of the research other social infrastructure PPPs have commenced.  122 
 123 
Data Collection 124 
Triangulation formed the basis of the data collection process as it can be used to overcome 125 
problems associated with bias and validity (Yin, 1984; Stake, 1995; Love et al., 2002). A 126 
series of informal discussions, semi-structured interviews and documentary sources (e.g., 127 
contractual documents) formed the cornerstones of the data collection process. 128 
 129 
Interviews were conducted at the interviewees’ offices and were digitally recorded, and 130 
then transcribed verbatim, to allow for any finer nuances to be detected. Interviews were 131 
purposely kept relaxed using phrases such as ‘tell me about it’ or ‘can you give me an 132 
example’. The indicative questions that were used for the interviews included: 133 
 134 
• What approach is being used to evaluate the performance of the PPP project you are 135 
involved with? 136 
• What do you consider to be the shortcomings of the performance evaluation process in 137 
the project? 138 
• How do you think performance evaluation can be improved in the project? 139 
 140 
The open nature of the questions stimulated avenues of interest to be pursued as they arose 141 
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without introducing bias in the response. Additional notes were taken during interviews to 142 
support the digital transcription process and to maintain validity and safeguard against the 143 
digital recorder’s failure. Notably, focused sampling was used for selecting interviewees as 144 
it is particularly effective for a case study that aims to explore new lines of inquiry.  145 
 146 
A total of 22 interviews were conducted with each varying in length from 90 minutes to 147 
two hours. A conscious effort was made to break down any barriers that may have existed 148 
between the interviewer and interviewee. Interviews were transcribed and then sent to the 149 
interviewee for checking and approval. Table 1 provides a summary of interviewees. To 150 
ensure confidentiality, each case is referred to as Project-A and Project-B with the data 151 
collection process occurring over a period of a year. 152 
 153 
Table 2: Interview respondents of Projects A and B 154 
Projects and Interviewees                   Serial Codes Organisations 
Project-A   
Procurement Director (PD) PD-A&B State Government 
Project Manager  PM-A State Government 
Service Director O/FM-A Clinical & Healthcare Provider 
Construction Manager CM-A Construction Company 
Architect D/A-A Design Firm 
Contract Advisor/Manager  CM/PA-A State Government 
Project-B   
Project Manager (PM) PM-B Construction Company 
Design Manager (DM) DM-B Design Firm 
Contract Manager (CM) CM-B Construction Company 
Engineering Manager (CEM) CEM-B Construction Company 
Facility/Asset Manager (F/AM) F/AM-B FM Group 
  155 
The Procurement Director was responsible for overseeing the progress of both case 156 
projects (A/B) as well as the senior management in charge of the essential parts of the 157 
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delivery of the assets (e.g., design, construction, operation and/or facility maintenance – 158 
FM). All practitioners that were interviewed had minimum of 10-years’ experience 159 
delivering social infrastructure PPPs in Australia and/or Europe.  160 
 161 
Data Analysis 162 
The narratives that were compiled were analysed using NVivo 10 software, which 163 
combines the efficient management of non-numerical, unstructured data with powerful 164 
processes of indexing and theorizing. NVivo 10 enabled additional data sources and journal 165 
notes to be incorporated into the analysis as well as identifying emergent new themes. The 166 
development and re-assessment of themes, as the analysis progressed, accords with calls to 167 
avoid confining data to pre-determined sets of categories. This process complied with the 168 
approach developed by Silverman (2006) for interpreting qualitative data. Kvale (1996) 169 
suggests that ad hoc methods for generating meaning enables the researcher to access “a 170 
variety of common-sense approaches to interview text using an interplay of techniques 171 
such as noting patterns, seeing plausibility, making comparisons etc. (p.204).” 172 
 173 
Case Background 174 
Project-A is a public hospital, encompassing more than 300 beds and housing more than 175 
1,000 staff. State-of-the-art facilities are embedded into the hospital. For example, 176 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging scanners, which ensure that a comprehensive range of 177 
clinical and healthcare services (e.g., pathology, general medical and medical specialities, 178 
general surgery and surgical specialities, maternity, intensive care, and adult rehabilitation) 179 
are offered to the local communities. The hospital had a contract value of AU$340 million 180 
in 2008, was procured using a Design Build Operate and Maintain (DBOM) and became 181 
operational in 2016. Contrastingly, Project-B was a regional prison, which aimed to deliver 182 
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more than 1,600 additional beds across the State’s prison system. This project replaced the 183 
existing facility, which initially was built in the 1980s and incorporated only 100 beds. 184 
Project-B had a contract value of AU$200 million in 2009 and was procured employing a 185 
Design Build Finance Maintain (DBFM) and was completed in 2016. 186 
 187 
Both DBOM and DBFM are forms of PPP. In the case of Project-A, the private-sector SPV 188 
handled the asset’s design, build, operation and maintenance, while the SPV of Project-B 189 
was responsible for designing, building, financing and maintaining the facility. Unlike 190 
Project-B, which was fully funded by the private-sector SPV by introducing equity 191 
investors and debt providers, Project-A was co-funded by the Australian Commonwealth 192 
and State Governments (i.e., AU$170 million from each). Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the 193 
structures of the case projects. 194 
 195 
 196 
Figure 1: Structure of Project-A 197 
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 198 
Figure 2: Structure of Project-B 199 
 200 
Both projects have a similar delivery process, involving: (1) Initiation & Planning (e.g., 201 
business case study, invitation for the Expression of Interest and evaluation of submitted 202 
proposals), Procurement (e.g., request for proposal, tendering/bidding and financial close) 203 
and Partnership (e.g., design, construction and/or operation and maintenance). 204 
 205 
Performance Evaluations of Case Projects 206 
The performance evaluation systems of Projects A and B contain two separate parts that 207 
were handled by the public authorities and the private-sector SPVs, respectively. The 208 
evaluations undertaken by the government focused on the assessment for VfM as well as 209 
business case development and the effectiveness of the tendering decision. Conversely, the 210 
measurements initiated by the private-sector entities concentrated adhering to the 211 
predetermined deliverables of schedule, budget and service (i.e., asset quality and/or 212 
operational outputs). For example, the Procurement Director stated: 213 
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“There are two parts of performance evaluation in the projects. For the 214 
government, we used the concept of ‘Gateway Review’ to control the 215 
performance of the project. So, during the inception stage, strategic evaluation 216 
for feasibility, such as value for money assessment under the Public Sector 217 
Comparator and a number of qualitative issues (for Project-A), and then an 218 
evaluative review for business case development were conducted, followed by 219 
assessments for confirming the defined outputs and checking the tender decision. 220 
For the private consortia, they checked if the projects were delivered on time and 221 
on budget or assessed if the operation can meet our devised key performance 222 
indicators (KPIs) (Project-A) …” 223 
 224 
The objective information obtained from documentary sources provided an understanding 225 
of the practice of evaluation being implemented in the case projects. According to the 226 
‘Project Summary’ of each case project, Project-B used only the Public Sector Comparator 227 
(PSC) for assessing VfM. In the case of Project-A VfM assessment depended upon the 228 
PSC and several non-quantitative measures (e.g., quality of services, range of services and 229 
additional services) (Tables 3 and 4). The ‘Service Agreement’ of Project-A also indicated 230 
that a total of 159 KPIs determined by the relevant public authority of the State 231 
Government were being used to monitor the service quality of the built facility. 232 
 233 
 234 
 235 
 236 
 237 
 238 
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Table 3: VfM assessment of Project-A 239 
Methods Main Contents 
Quantitative comparison 
PSC: (,000): AU$6,268,756 
Private-Sector Delivery (,000): AU$4,960,040 
Saving (,000): AU$1,308,715 
Saving (%): 20.9% 
Qualitative consideration Quality of Services, Range of Services and Additional Services 
 240 
Table 4: VfM assessment of Project-B 241 
State’s Risk Adjusted 
PSC (AU$,000) 
SPV’s Risk Adjusted 
Proposal (AU$,000) Savings (AU$,000) Saving Percentage 
$452,590 $372,312 $80,278 17.7% 
 242 
The interviewees from the private SPVs of both PPPs further explained the evaluation 243 
systems of the projects. For instance, the Service Director, who oversaw the subcontractors 244 
and the operation and maintenance of Project-A, made the following comment: 245 
 246 
“We are evaluating each component in the design and construction by examining 247 
financial and time performance, and we employed external engineering 248 
specialists to inspect the quality regularly, to ensure the quality of the asset. We 249 
have key performance indicators (KPIs) determined by the government to control 250 
operational outputs. If we cannot meet those KPIs, we will get abatement.” 251 
 252 
Like Project-A, the performance evaluation that was undertaken by the SPV of Project-B 253 
focused on traditional measures of TCQ. The Project Manager (PM-B), for example, 254 
introduced that: 255 
 256 
“As a private contractor, we talk about time, cost and quality in the evaluation. 257 
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They are the only performance measures we have for this project. Time is now 258 
our premium, and in terms of costs, we are running within the budget. Quality – 259 
this measure is about once we start building – the quality of the product that we 260 
put forward.” 261 
 262 
The performance evaluation systems for Projects A and B are illustrated in Figures 3 and 4, 263 
with attention being placed on a quantitative VfM assessment, reviews of business case 264 
development and tendering decisions, examinations of TCQ or operational measurement 265 
that relied on KPIs. All interviewees (Projects A and B) maintained that the approaches 266 
that were applied to evaluate PPPs needed to be improved owing to a series of 267 
shortcomings, which are presented and discussed below. 268 
 269 
 270 
Figure 3: Performance Evaluation System of Project-A 271 
 272 
 273 
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 274 
Figure 4: Performance Evaluation System of Project-B 275 
 276 
Shortcomings of Existing Performance Evaluations 277 
There was consensus amongst interviewees from the public sector (i.e., PD-A&B and 278 
CM/PA-B in Table 1) that there was a need to improve the existing performance 279 
evaluations as they were not robust enough to accommodate the deliverables to ensure the 280 
long-term success of their projects. These included, for example, a mechanism to engender 281 
and enact continuous improvement, efficiency and competitiveness of the 282 
tendering/bidding procedures and non-financial benefits in VfM assessment. The 283 
Procurement Director stated that: 284 
 285 
“The track record of our approach used for performance evaluation is good, but 286 
we will have to refine it. In particular, there is a need to ensure that lessons 287 
learned are properly captured. But this internal process with the projects was not 288 
robust enough and we are constantly improving it. And, PPP approval process 289 
within the government in the Procurement phase sometimes has been protracted. 290 
Although we can get through that quickly, focusing more on the approval 291 
procedure in evaluation can increase its efficiency. Moreover, competition of 292 
tendering/bidding is important but this was missed when we measured our 293 
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projects, and, the PSC for assessing VfM is not perfect though it has worked well 294 
with us. VfM is a holistic consideration of project benefits, not just delivering the 295 
required scope at the cheapest cost. It is related to a wide range of benefits to the 296 
public, such as economic and social.” 297 
 298 
In addition to these issues, the Contract Manager of Project-A identified the deficiency of 299 
the KPIs that were designed and implemented with an aim of controlling the operational 300 
outputs of the private-sector SPVs. This experienced PPP practitioner stated: 301 
 302 
“KPIs for the operation of the facility will be used for next a couple of years, but 303 
we are in an intensively changing business environment and there is no doubt the 304 
indicators designed today will not be suitable for the whole contractual period.” 305 
 306 
The information derived from the interviews with the key managerial practitioners of the 307 
private SPVs of Projects A and B (e.g., Corporate Service Director, Project Manager and 308 
Design Manager) indicated that the project measurements conducted by the private-sector 309 
entities were confronted with challenges. As mentioned above, the approaches adopted by 310 
the SPVs to the performance measurement of the case projects are referred to as ex-post 311 
evaluation, which were concerned with TCQ. The use of TCQ in an evaluation of PPPs has 312 
been criticised by both academia and practitioners as it cannot capture such issues as 313 
design innovation, asset sustainability and stakeholders’ satisfaction, all of which are 314 
expected by the governments from SPVs. This was re-stated by the Procurement Director 315 
(PD-A&B) for the two case projects as the following comment: 316 
 317 
“We expected an introduction of private consortia would be an opportunity to 318 
 
 
 
16 
drive innovation in design through the whole of life perspective and enhance the 319 
sustainability of the facilities and end-users’ satisfaction.” 320 
 321 
The current performance evaluation of the projects, however, failed to indicate whether the 322 
public client’s expectations had been met. For instance, the Construction Manager of 323 
Project-A identified that traditional TCQ assessment is too simplistic to capture inherent 324 
complexities and uncertainties of PPPs and stated: 325 
 326 
“An effective measurement should reflect not only tangible but also intangible 327 
issues. But the TCQ-focused assessment failed in doing so because it is not a 328 
complete measurement. For example, the state government would like to expand 329 
the hospital in the future. Under the long-term planning by 2020, they will 330 
expand the hospital by another 100 beds. So, what we did was we came up with a 331 
design which allowed, effectively, half of the ward to be replicated and then built 332 
with minimal interruption to the existing facility, and then all the services which 333 
are involved for the hospital are able to be added on - hooked into - to 334 
supplement the additional hundred beds. In the existing evaluation, how are these 335 
innovative works being reflected?” 336 
 337 
The Project Manager and Design Manager of Project-B possessed a similar view as they 338 
considered that more intangible performance measures should have been implemented to 339 
evaluate the design and construction of the PPP project, with emphasis being placed on 340 
innovation and asset sustainability. Such intangibles are critical to the satisfaction levels of 341 
the owner and end-users of an asset. The Service Director of Project-A supported this view 342 
as well, not only of the TCQ measures adopted for design and construction, but also the 343 
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KPIs devised for asset operation and facility maintenance. The Service Director stated: 344 
 345 
“If I were the director of the State government responsible for setting up this 346 
contract, I would devise far more engineering KPIs. I would like to make sure the 347 
hospital is well maintained and there was proper asset planning or condition 348 
reporting etc. The government now is focusing too much on clinical care and has 349 
got their clinical care covered, but they don’t have the building measurement 350 
covered and the performance indicators for FM have not been documented well. 351 
This is not good for ensuring VfM.” 352 
 353 
This was confirmed by the Asset Manager of Project-B, who suggested that as the project 354 
had been delivered using a DBFM, the State government and SPV should have made 355 
explicit the measures for controlling the quality of the FM work. After all, operational 356 
expenditure far outweighs capital costs when the life of an asset is taken into consideration. 357 
Stressing the importance of measuring the performance of operations and maintenance the 358 
Director stated: 359 
 360 
“Maintenance is a key thing. You cannot improve or repair something until you 361 
know what is wrong. You need to measure it to find out, so effective indicators 362 
are required.”  363 
 364 
The key emergent themes and issues arising from the second part of the interviews 365 
regarding the shortcomings of traditional performance measurement in PPPs are presented 366 
in Figure 5. There were a series of deficiencies in the performance evaluation systems of 367 
Projects A and B, which included: (1) a cost-based VfM assessment rather than a complete 368 
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evaluation for both financial and non-financial benefits; (2) an ineffective and inefficient 369 
internal process for absorbing the lessons learned from project evaluation; (3) neglect of 370 
critical issues relating to the procurement of the projects (i.e., tendering/bidding); (4) a 371 
simplistic TCQ assessment for design and construction; (5) the lack of performance 372 
measures for the outputs of FM works; and (6) the weak ability of operational KPIs in 373 
accommodating business environment changes. 374 
 375 
 376 
Figure 5: Key emergent themes from the case studies 377 
 378 
Recommendations for Improvements 379 
The case studies undertaken have identified shortcomings with the performance evaluation 380 
that was used to measure PPPs. Based on these findings, a process-based and 381 
stakeholder-oriented perspective should be addressed in the performance evaluation of 382 
PPPs. If, for example, KPIs focus on process and key stakeholders’ expectations, they can 383 
reflect the distinct feature of PPPs related to a unique delivery process and sophisticated 384 
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stakeholder networks. In fact, most of the interviewees considered that a 385 
life-cycle/process-based measurement approach is ideal for PPPs and can supersede 386 
traditional ex-post evaluation due to its robustness in being able to capture all the 387 
deliverables of PPPs (i.e., tangible and intangible) that cascade from the initiation and 388 
planning to operation and maintenance phases. For example, the Contract Manager of 389 
Project-A from the public authority explicitly proffered that: 390 
 391 
“As a consultant, I care about delivery process and key stakeholders, especially 392 
in a social infrastructure project, like a hospital. This is because PPPs are unique 393 
for their life-cycle with a long-term contractual arrangement between public and 394 
private sectors and a sophisticated stakeholder network … So, addressing process 395 
and stakeholders’ needs can reveal all important deliverables and then improve 396 
the effectiveness of the performance evaluation system of the project.” 397 
 398 
The Project Manager and Design Manager of Project-B supported the view expressed 399 
above. They also argued that future PMSs devised for PPPs must be ‘life-cycle’ oriented 400 
and designed for reflecting whether or not the key project stakeholders’ expectations have 401 
been satisfied, rather than just simply indicating if the projects were delivered on ‘time’ 402 
and/or on budget. Furthermore, some of the interviewees suggested that a 403 
life-cycle/process-based and stakeholder-oriented measurement could be achieved by 404 
deriving and using a sequence of project-phase-based KPIs (e.g., indicators of PPP 405 
initiation, procurement, construction, operation and facility maintenance as well as those 406 
indicators in respect of client’s and/or end-users’ satisfaction). Additionally, it was 407 
identified during the case studies that KPIs for assets’ operations are not capable of 408 
accommodating intensive changes throughout a long-term contractual period. Thus, as 409 
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proposed by the Contract Manager of Project-A, a review mechanism needs to be launched 410 
into PPP projects to update the operational KPIs: 411 
 412 
“The contractual arrangement of our PPP project is up to 25 years. So, a review 413 
mechanism is useful for the operational KPIs in order to ensure they will be able 414 
to accommodate future social and economic changes. But the state government 415 
obviously does not have such a robust mechanism to update them.” 416 
 417 
A review mechanism for KPIs, theoretically, can underpin the implementation of a 418 
process-based PMS. This is because the performance measures of the process-based PMSs 419 
are required to reflect the long-term business environment in which the organisation 420 
operates (Neely, 1999). With this principle, a review mechanism of life-cycle PMSs (in 421 
PPPs) will help to ensure VfM and success of the projects. 422 
 423 
Assessment for VfM, as discussed above, is a pivotal component of the performance 424 
evaluation system of PPPs. The Office of Government Commerce in the UK (2002) 425 
defines VfM as “the optimum combination of whole life cost and quality to meet the user’s 426 
requirement.” It is a concept relating to overall outcomes achieved, covering a wide range 427 
of issues involving life-cycle costs, physical and service quality, maintainability, social 428 
benefits and sustainability (Department of Treasury and Finance Victoria, 2007). 429 
Nonetheless, the PSC, which is widely applied to PPPs, is a purely cost-based assessment, 430 
and thus it largely ignores non-quantitative issues. For instance, in the case projects, net 431 
present values (NPVs) of the projects were adopted as the key criteria by decision makers 432 
in state government to determine whether a PPP would be a feasible way for procuring the 433 
public assets, though limited non-financial benefits of services (quality and range) had 434 
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been considered in Project-B. A broad life-cycle VfM assessment with consideration of 435 
both qualitative and quantitative issues should be proposed and developed for PPPs. Such 436 
issues include whole-life cost, physical quality, service quality and range, asset’s 437 
conditions (e.g., maintainability and sustainability) and social or economic impacts on 438 
local community and the public. This view was confirmed by the two interviewees who 439 
claimed that it is necessary to shift VfM assessment of PPPs from a cost-based evaluation 440 
to a whole-life measurement conducted within both quantitative and qualitative contexts. 441 
 442 
It is also noted from the empirical findings that ineffective and inefficient internal learning 443 
is a weakness of the performance evaluation systems of the case projects. Theoretically, 444 
organisational learning is an enabler for business growth and success and maintains a vital 445 
role in the process-based performance measurement of the organisation (Love et al., 2004). 446 
Kululanga et al. (2001) also claim that organisational learning provides a vehicle” for 447 
delivering continuous improvement and incremental innovation. This implies that the 448 
“mechanisms” that stimulate effective and efficient learning must be integrated into the 449 
entire business process of the organisation to enhance their ability to capture and absorb 450 
“lessons” learned. As stated by the Procurement Director (PD-A&B), the public authority 451 
that oversaw the delivery progress of Projects A and B had already initiated actions to 452 
improve and accelerate its internal learning process of PPPs. The State Government is 453 
currently implementing a new system to absorb the information that was derived from the 454 
projects. Therefore, a learning mechanism should be incorporated into the PPP life-cycle to 455 
serve as a key function of their future performance evaluation. 456 
 457 
Life-Cycle Performance Prism 458 
Emerging from the case studies is the recommendation for a process-based and 459 
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stakeholder-oriented measurement to be developed with consideration of VfM assessment 460 
and continuous improvement that engenders learning. Neely et al. (2001) have suggested 461 
that the measurement for what stakeholders’ need and how they contribute to the 462 
organisation should be conducted simultaneously in a PMS. At this juncture, a new 463 
Performance Prism, which is different from that one originally proposed by Neely et al. 464 
(2001), can be developed as a ‘stepping stone’ for ameliorating performance evaluation of 465 
future PPPs (Figure 6). 466 
 467 
 468 
Figure 6: Life-cycle Performance Prism for PPP Evaluation (Adapted from Neely et al. 469 
2001) 470 
 471 
Figure 6 illustrates how the proposed framework can deal with the prevailing issues 472 
confronting PPP performance evaluation. Specifically, the process-based and 473 
stakeholder-oriented measurements, as demonstrated above, focus on evaluating the 474 
deliverables of each project phase of a PPP (e.g., the suitability of business case 475 
development, completeness of macro-environmental study, competitiveness of tendering 476 
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procedure and innovation in design). Consequently, the problematic issues in the existing 477 
performance evaluation system of a PPP, for example, incomplete and ineffective 478 
measurements for the project’s procurement, design and construction, operations and 479 
maintenance, would be resolved by applying the Performance Prism framework. 480 
 481 
Benefiting from a KPI review mechanism, the performance measures developed with the 482 
process and stakeholder-oriented measurement will be equipped with a robust capability in 483 
accommodating demographic and environmental changes (i.e., political, economic, social 484 
and legal). In addition, the proposed life-cycle Performance Prism possesses can improve 485 
the derived paucities, such as the myopia of VfM assessment and weak internal learning. 486 
This is because it emphasises: (1) a comprehensive evaluation for VfM that considers 487 
financial benefits as well as macro-impacts on local communities and the public (e.g., 488 
social benefits and economic development); and (2) effective and efficient organisational 489 
learning to absorb the “lessons” emerging from the projects. 490 
 491 
Implications for Practice 492 
The proposed life-cycle Performance Prism provides stakeholders of a PPP (e.g., public 493 
governor, designer, builder, operator and facility maintainer) with an explicit and reliable 494 
direction of how to improve the systems or approaches applied to measure the performance 495 
of their projects. The application of the Performance Prism has the potential to provide the 496 
public and private-sector with the ability to: (1) evaluate their projects by concentrating on 497 
the process-based deliverables (e.g., business case, planning, decision on tendering or 498 
bidding, asset design, construction and operation and/or facility maintenance); (2) 499 
undertake an examination of VfM; and (3) examine the effectiveness/efficiency of learning 500 
mechanisms to be employed. These immediate benefits will provide the basis for ensuring 501 
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projects processes and product are delivered successfully. Figure 7 depicts how a shift 502 
from conventional ex-ante/ex-post evaluations to a life-cycle measurement that addresses 503 
the perspectives of the developed Performance Prism will be future-proofing PPPs, for 504 
example, enabling an asset’s sustainability and ensuring a continuous value to meet key 505 
stakeholders’ expectations. 506 
 507 
 508 
Figure 7: Performance Prism framework in benefiting PPPs 509 
Note: “+” denotes the positive effects generated by the framework on PPPs 510 
 511 
As noted from Figure 7, changing a VfM assessment from a finance-focused evaluation to 512 
a comprehensive life-cycle examination may significantly improve the veracity of the 513 
business cases of PPPs. In turn, this may provide the government with a broader concept of 514 
VfM and provide guidance to pursue a complete realization of project success. The 515 
process- and stakeholder-oriented measurement, which is underpinned by a life-cycle 516 
learning mechanism, is capable of effectively capturing the conditions of a PPP project’s 517 
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initiation and planning, procurement, construction, operation and facility management.  518 
 519 
This type of measurement can benefit the government by improving their efficiency in 520 
decision making in terms of the options for infrastructure delivery. At the same time, it can 521 
assist the private-sector entity to effectively and efficiently monitor their deliverables and 522 
completely meet the key stakeholders’ expectations over the project life-cycle. For instance, 523 
while the government can oversee the performance of its PPP project by screening the 524 
design KPIs or FM KPIs, the private SPV can also examine such KPIs to understand 525 
whether the public client/end-users are satisfied with the operational outputs. 526 
 527 
As a consequence of embedding a learning mechanism into the KPIs, the quality (e.g., 528 
physical quality and service quality) as well as the sustainability of the built asset will be 529 
enhanced. This leads to an increase in end user satisfaction and a decrease in risks that can 530 
result in the underachievement of VfM and project long-term success. Moreover, the 531 
systematic mechanism for reviewing/updating the implemented KPIs can facilitate PPPs in 532 
accommodating changes to the internal and external environment, thereby enhancing the 533 
whole-of-life suitability of the asset. From this stance, increased end-user satisfaction may 534 
occur, which in turn will be significant to the realisation of VfM and the project success. In 535 
summary, the Performance Prism framework can enable the continuous value of the asset 536 
throughout the life-cycle of a PPP. 537 
 538 
Conclusion 539 
PPPs have been widely used to deliver public infrastructure projects. Nevertheless, the 540 
question remains about how to comprehensively and effectively evaluate their performance. 541 
Previous research has identified that an understanding of the practice of performance 542 
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evaluation/measurement is a prerequisite for the successful design and implementation of a 543 
new PMS in the organisation. Therefore, case studies of the Australian social infrastructure 544 
PPPs, which relied on semi-structure interviews and documentary reviews, were conducted 545 
and have been presented in this paper. 546 
 547 
The empirical examination of a prison and hospital projects delivered using a form of PPPs 548 
has provided the basis to identify that there are paucities and “gaps” existing in the projects’ 549 
performance evaluations. These included a narrow assessment for VfM, an incomplete 550 
evaluation from procurement phase to post-implementation stages (e.g., design, 551 
construction, operation and maintenance) and ineffective and inefficient internal learning. 552 
Because of these findings, an innovative life-cycle Performance Prism was proposed and it 553 
was demonstrated how it can contribute to effectively address the current problematic 554 
issues in the performance evaluation of PPPs. 555 
 556 
The outcome of this paper is theoretically significant, and a new approach for measuring 557 
PPPs throughout a project’s lifecycle has been proposed. It contributes to the body of 558 
knowledge of public project governance and evaluation within the context of PPPs. 559 
Additionally, this paper is practical, as the developed framework was empirically derived 560 
from an interpretation of ‘real-world’ projects. It can therefore ensure VfM is achieved as 561 
an effective and efficient evaluation and governance for PPP is established. However, 562 
future research is required to develop a balanced abatement mechanism, which can form 563 
the foundation for an application of the proposed Performance Prism framework. This will 564 
be useful for PPP performance measurement practice, which is particularly significant for 565 
the public authority to govern a project’s outputs and outcomes. In addressing this issue, 566 
emphasis needs to be placed on the development of incentives and guidance so that SPVs 567 
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can understand and accommodate an asset’s performance risks. Therefore, an appropriate 568 
payment mechanism that is calibrated to monitor and measure PPPs needs to be designed 569 
to engender a contract capable of providing long-term value to key stakeholders. 570 
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